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Abstract 
Polls show that immigration is one of the most important issues when citizens are 
asked to rank different policy topics. Individual attitudes towards immigrants are 
important, as public opinion to some degree influences politics and policies in a 
country. Moreover, it is important for the integration of immigrants in a country, as 
they need to be employed by natives and welcomed into the social activities. Previous 
research on developed countries has found that more comprehensive welfare institu-
tions lead to more positive individual attitudes towards immigrants. This study 
advances the literature and examines the relationship between welfare institutions and 
attitudes towards immigrants, in the context of less developed countries. Four 
mechanisms found in previous research on developed countries are in this study 
contextualized into a weaker institutional setting in less developed countries. In this 
study, two different dimensions of attitudes to immigrants are examined: the cultural 
and the material dimension. Using individual data from the World Values Survey 
including at least 39 countries the relationship between welfare institutions and 
attitudes towards immigrants is examined. The data is explored by using a multilevel 
logistic regression including controls for several relevant factors, both at the 
individual and country level, emphasized in previous research. The analysis shows 
that welfare institutions have a positive influence on citizens’ attitudes to immigrants 
along the material dimension, while the result for the cultural dimension is not as 
robust and is sensitive to the specific modeling.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 	  
Immigration is frequently considered in the top of public policy concern and for 
example in the 2015 Autumn Eurobarometer immigration is positioned as the most 
important issue (European Commission, 2015:13). Individual attitudes towards 
immigrants are an important factor when trying to understand immigration and 
integration policies. It is essential to know why individuals support more or less 
immigrants coming into their country, because the public opinion to some degree 
shapes politics and policies (Esipova et al., 2015:37f; Tunon and Baruah, 2012:151). 
Moreover, public attitudes affect the status and wellbeing of immigrants and 
contribute to the environment where immigrants feel either acceptance or dislike from 
the people in the country (Tunon and Baruah, 2012:151). A positive integration of 
immigrants is dependent on that people in the country are willing to employ 
immigrants and welcome them to their social activities 
 
     A lot of the previous research has tried to explain why individuals have certain 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. It has been found that individual 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration depend on several different factors at 
the individual level, as for example economic interest (Kessler, 2001:24; Malchow-
Møller et al., 2008:257; Mayda, 2006:526f; O’Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:857; Scheve 
and Slaughter, 2001:144), cultural and ethnic identity (Burns and Gimpel 2000:222f; 
Card et al., 2012:110f; Chandler and Tsai, 2001:186; Citrin et al., 1997:874f; 
Dustmann and Preston, 2007:26; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010:79; Sides and Citrin, 
2007:500), and level of education (Dustmann and Preston, 2006:29; Gang et al., 
2013:187f; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010:79; Kessler, 2001:19ff; Wilkes et al., 
2008:325f).1  
 
     Determinants at the country level is not as thoroughly explored (Kleemans and 
Klugman, 2009:6; Semyonov et al., 2008:8) but some determinants have been found 
in previous research, as for example level of immigration into a country (Van 
Oorschot and Uunk, 2007:77f), the national economic context (Facchini and Mayda, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) and Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for an overview of common 
determinants of attitudes to immigrants in developed countries. 
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2009:312f; Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:18), ethnic fractionalization (Reeskens and 
Van Oorschot, 2012:131; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009:225f), and comprehensiveness of 
welfare institutions (Boräng, 2012:155: Crepaz, 2008:156; Crepaz and Damron, 
2009:457). The main focus of this thesis is welfare institutions as a country level 
determinant for individual attitudes towards immigrants. This contextual determinant 
has not previously (to the best of my knowledge) been used when studying attitudes 
towards immigrants in the context of less developed countries, which is the focus of 
this thesis. 
 
     A common feature for most of the research on attitudes towards immigrants is the 
focus on developed countries, mostly in Europe and North America where large 
opinion surveys are conducted regularly (Lawrence, 2011:146; Money, 2010:2; 
Orcés, 2009:134; Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1538). The neglect of the remaining 
countries is severe as more than half of the global migration is occurring outside the 
developed countries and this severely hampers the comparative scope of the current 
research. A complete understanding of the determinants shaping attitudes towards 
immigrants cannot be attained until the lens is broadened to include the neglected 
parts of the world (Money, 2010:2).  
 
     The aim of this thesis is to examine if the comprehensiveness of a country’s wel-
fare institutions influence citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants in a broad range of 
countries, including primarily developing and non-OECD countries. The contribution 
of this thesis is twofold: The first contribution is theoretical as the theory behind 
previous studies needs to be revised and developed to fit in the context of less devel-
oped countries. The second contribution is empirical, as this thesis empirically test the 
relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants in a 
broader set of countries. The empirical literature is advanced to include not only 
developed countries but also less developed countries with different institutional 
settings.   
 
     In this thesis a multilevel logistic regression analysis is used with survey data on 
the individual level from the sixth wave (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey 
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(WVS) to map individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants in at least 39 countries.2 
Attitudes towards immigrants are examined at two different dimensions: the cultural 
and the material dimension. The result of this thesis demonstrates that the 
comprehensiveness of welfare institutions have a positive effect on attitudes towards 
immigrants when a material dimension is considered. In contrast, the result for the 
cultural dimension of attitudes is not as robust and is sensitive to the specific 
modeling. 
 
     The thesis is organized as follows: In the next section (2.1) the institutional theory 
guiding the study is presented. This is followed up by a section (2.2) on the previous 
findings on the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immi-
grants in developed countries. This section explores two different dimensions (the 
cultural and the material) of attitudes towards immigrants and the mechanisms behind 
the influence of the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions on attitudes towards 
immigrants. In the following section (2.3) a review of the literature on attitudes 
towards immigrants in less developed countries is presented, followed by section 2.4 
where the mechanisms from the literature on developed countries are contextualized 
to less developed countries and two hypotheses for the study are presented. This is 
followed by a methodological section (3) where the chosen method and the different 
variables are described and justified. The results for the two different dimensions are 
presented in section four followed by a final section (5) with discussion and 
conclusions. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Institutional Theory 
One important assumption for the study of welfare institutions’ influence on citizens’ 
attitudes is that institutions are able to shape the public opinion. According to March 
and Olsen (1989:160), “institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines 
that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations.” 
Additionally, institutions are characterized by their ability to influence individuals’ 
behavior for generations. It is claimed that institutions posses a legitimating capacity, 
able to influence individuals to behave in violation of their own self-interest (March 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The number of countries varies between the two different dimensions and the different models in the analysis but 
the lowest number of countries is 39. 
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and Olsen, 1989:22f). Institutions provide a moral guide and act as filters for 
interpretation and action (Hall and Taylor, 1996:939; Immergut, 1998:20).  
 
     According to Rothstein (1998:135ff), institutions and policies affect opinions, 
interests, values, preferences and ideology. When an institution is created it reflects 
what political actors consider as morally right and it also influences what future actors 
will regard as morally correct. The ethics in a society are therefore an outcome of 
previously installed institutions. Social norms are an outcome of the institutional 
environment that has been created by political decisions. Svallfors (2003:496) claims 
that institutions stipulate ‘normalcy’, propose to the citizens what is possible to 
achieve, and what is regarded as impermissible.  
 
     The development of the welfare state generates moral capabilities to the people 
because of its moral objectives. It is claimed that the institutionalization of public 
welfare provision broadens the moral perspectives of the people and they will be more 
supportive towards welfare institutions (Mau, 2004:53f). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that welfare states contain not only formal social policy engagements but also 
a communal pattern of established solidarity and opinions of social fairness (Arts and 
Gelissen, 2001:296; Crepaz and Damron, 2009:439ff; Jaeger, 2006:159). This is 
culturally and historically rooted in welfare institutions that continuously influence 
individual norms and values (Jaeger, 2006:159). 
 
     To summarize, there is evidence supporting that institutions in general and welfare 
institutions in particular influence peoples’ attitudes. In the next section the relation-
ship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants is explored. 
2.2 Welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants 
Historically, immigration and comprehensive welfare institutions have commonly 
been presented as a conflicted combination. According to Freeman (1986:52), the 
welfare state is closely connected to the nation-state and needs boundaries to distin-
guish members from non-members. A generous welfare system has been regarded as 
incompatible with immigration and it has been discussed if a comprehensive welfare 
system can survive large-scale immigration. T. H. Marshall (Cited in Kymlicka, 
2015:5) claims that the welfare state is related to a social membership in a community 
and not universal humanitarianism. In contrast, more recent studies present evidences 
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that the threat from immigrants to comprehensive welfare institutions is exaggerated 
(Banting et al., 2006:83; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009:225f).  
 
     At the individual level, two different dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants 
have been discovered in the previous research. The first dimension is native resent-
ment and this is motivated by perceived dissimilarities in religion, ethnicity and race 
(Crepaz and Damron, 2009:439). This dimension covers a more cultural dimension 
with a diffuse fear of the other, for example that immigrants are criminals and rapists. 
There is also a perceived threat from immigrants to the cultural traditions of the coun-
try (Crepaz, 2008:65).  
 
     Second, welfare chauvinism is the fear among native citizens that immigrants take 
their jobs, homes and abuse the welfare system (Faist, 1994:440). Welfare chauvinism 
infers that immigrants are attracted to the country due to its generous welfare benefits. 
There is a competition for scarce resources and immigrants are perceived as a net loss, 
meaning they contribute with less than they receive (Crepaz and Damron, 2009:439). 
Moreover, it implies that “immigrants are less entitled to welfare benefits and 
services than the native population” (Van der Waal et al., 2013:165). This captures 
the material dimension of immigrant attitudes, the perceived increased competition 
over scarce resources due to immigrants. In line with this dimension citizens in coun-
tries with more comprehensive welfare institutions could be more negative towards 
immigrants to protect the labour market and welfare system. 
 
     However, in contrast to the theory of welfare chauvinism it has been found that 
citizens in more comprehensive welfare states tend to have more positive attitudes 
towards immigrants (Boräng, 2012:155; Crepaz and Damron, 2009:457; Ervasti et al., 
2008:203). Crepaz (2008:ch5) distinguish between the cultural and material dimen-
sion and discovers that more comprehensive welfare institutions decrease welfare 
chauvinism, but does not find a significant effect along the cultural dimension of 
attitudes. Several mechanisms behind the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes 
to immigrants have been suggested by previous research on developed countries. 
First, the broad solidarity in a country can be an important factor influencing attitudes 
towards immigrants. The moral basis of the welfare state has been described as a 
moral obligation to care for other citizens and especially individuals with less 
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resources or in a vulnerable phase of life (Bergmark et al., 2000:241). Welcoming 
immigrants into the country and integrate them into the society is an act of solidarity, 
which has some common features with the tasks of the welfare state. Namely, to assist 
individuals in need and in a vulnerable situation (Boräng, 2015:221). More 
comprehensive welfare institutions are beneficial for creating a more wide-ranging 
solidarity, as the conflicts over redistribution are reduced rather than reinforced 
(Boräng, 2015:219; Rothstein, 1998:163f). It has been found that this broad national 
solidarity can be extended to non-citizens, where the division between citizens and 
immigrants is lessened in countries with more comprehensive welfare states (Crepaz 
and Damron, 2009:457). Arts and Gelissen (2001:297) conclude that there is a 
convincing correspondence between the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions 
and the level of solidarity among the citizens. Thus, the more wide-ranging solidarity 
in more comprehensive welfare states can potentially lead to more positive attitudes 
towards immigrants among the citizens. The solidarity of helping people in need 
should be more intrinsic among people living in a country where this is commonly 
done by the state for its citizens.  
 
     The mechanism of broad solidarity can influence attitudes at both the cultural 
dimension and the material dimension. A broader solidarity in a country should lead 
to less racism and the perceived cultural threat from immigrants should also be 
relieved. The broader solidarity should make native people more understanding 
towards immigrants’ struggle and therefore be more welcoming towards immigrants 
along both dimensions. However, an important distinction between migrant workers 
and refugees is missing in this study, which could make this mechanism less signifi-
cant. Boräng (2012:145ff) discovers that the positive effect of more comprehensive 
welfare states on attitudes towards immigrants is more prominent when considering 
refugees in comparison to migrant workers. This distinction is not made in the WVS 
and therefore this mechanism may not be as important as if the distinction was made 
between different types of immigrants.  
 
     Second, according to Kumlin and Rothstein (2005:360f), more comprehensive 
welfare institutions can promote higher levels of generalized trust in a society. This is 
believed to be driven by the redistribution of resources through welfare institutions 
increasing the economic equality and equality of opportunity, which could lead to 
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more generalized trust (Larsen, 2007:99f; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005:44; Uslaner 
and Brown, 2005:889). When there is a high unequal distribution of resources, 
individuals at the top and bottom do not regard themselves as sharing the same fate. 
Where inequality is high, individuals will have more pessimistic expectations of the 
future (Uslaner and Brown, 2005:869). A more even distribution of resources consoli-
dates collective values and experiences in society. If welfare is distributed more une-
qually, negative stereotypes of different groups will be more present and mistrust and 
tensions will become more widespread (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006:46).  
 
     The level of trust in a country can influence individuals’ attitudes towards immi-
grants. Boräng (2015:221) argues that immigration policy has two main objectives: to 
guarantee that people in need of protection receive protection and to reject protection 
to people in no real need of protection. The decision is often taken under uncertainty 
and therefore two basic problems arise: either individuals in need of protection get 
rejected or people in no need of protection receive protection. Individuals with higher 
levels of generalized trust should to a larger extent believe that immigrants coming 
into the country really are in need and not only coming in order to abuse the welfare 
system. Consequently, they are more concerned that people in need of protection are 
rejected. People with lower levels of generalized trust should be more concerned with 
immigrants not in need of protection abusing the welfare system and thus be more 
negative and suspicious towards immigrants.    
 
     The mechanism of generalized trust should be relevant for both the cultural and 
material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants. The higher trust to other people 
should decrease the cultural resentment towards immigrants as they in general are 
seen as more trustworthy. The preconceptions of immigrants as criminals, rapists and 
threats to the culture should be lessened with higher trust in other people. At the 
material dimension higher generalized trust should lead to preferences of more equita-
ble treatment of all people, including immigrants. Citizens should for example be 
more positive to include immigrants in the labour market. 
 
     The third mechanism is that welfare institutions can influence citizens’ perceptions 
of the capacity of the state. In countries with comprehensive welfare institutions the 
state has taken a large responsibility and demonstrate a capability and willingness to 
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carry out extensive duties related to social solidarity (Boräng, 2015:220). Svallfors 
(2003:496f, 513f) argues that certain institutions influence perceptions of what the 
state is capable of doing and what it should do. Furthermore, individuals in countries 
with more comprehensive welfare institutions are more positive to state intervention 
in comparison to citizens in countries with less comprehensive welfare institutions. 
Therefore, as Boräng (2015:222) argues, in more comprehensive welfare states citi-
zens are used to and expect the state to protect people. They believe the state has the 
capacity to handle the situation and to offer protection and security and therefore the 
attitudes towards immigrants will be more positive. This should be relevant for both 
the cultural dimension and the material dimension. The cultural dimension should be 
affected, as a high capacity of the state to accomplish acts of solidarity should lead to 
more solidarity among the people, as discussed on the first mechanism. With a more 
widespread solidarity the cultural threat from immigrants should be relieved. At the 
material dimension the capacity of the state can reduce the fear of being unemployed 
due to increased competition from immigrants. A high capacity of the state indicates 
that they can take care of people if they get unemployed or stimulate the job market to 
create more jobs.  
 
     The fourth mechanism is the increased notion of general economic safety in 
society. Citizens in countries with more comprehensive welfare institutions should 
feel safer as they are better protected against poverty. If individuals become sick or 
unemployed there are social safety nets protecting them from ending up in severe 
poverty. This may not influence attitudes at the cultural dimension but welfare 
chauvinism could be decreased with more general economic safety, as the fear of 
competition can be lessened if people feel that they are protected. In comparison, if 
you are not protected the perceived increased competition from immigrants should be 
more fearful. The increased risk of ending up in severe poverty could lead to more 
negative attitudes towards immigrants, especially, the ones who feel an immediate 
threat to their income. This is in line with Semyonov et al. (2006:444) who argue that 
the perceived threat of the foreign population is reduced with increased economic 
prosperity. Thus, more prosperous people should in general feel economically safer in 
a society, as they are less dependent of welfare institutions and benefits. 
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     To summarize, in this section it has been revealed that welfare institutions can 
have a positive influence on attitudes towards immigrants. The four mechanisms 
believed to explain this relationship are (1) more widespread solidarity, (2) higher 
generalized trust, (3) higher perception of state capacity, and (4) higher general eco-
nomic safety. These mechanisms have all been discovered when studying attitudes 
towards immigrants in developed countries with well-established welfare institutions. 
This limits the understanding of how these mechanisms function in the context of the 
less developed countries, which is the focus of this study. As stated in the introduc-
tion, the intention of this study is to advance this literature and broaden the 
understanding by examining a broader set of countries, mostly including less devel-
oped countries. But, before moving on to contextualize these mechanisms in less 
developed countries, the next section reviews previous research on attitudes towards 
immigrants in the context of less developed countries.  
2.3 Attitudes towards immigrants in less developed countries 
As mentioned in the introduction, most previous research on determinants of attitudes 
towards immigrants has been focused on developed countries, mainly in Europe and 
North America (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:2; Lawrence, 2011:143; Money, 
2010:2; Orcés, 2009:134; Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1536ff). However, there are a 
few studies with focus on attitudes towards immigrants in a broader set of countries 
including many developing and non-OECD countries.  
 
     Esipova et al. (2015:1) study 140 countries worldwide by using the Gallup’s 
World Poll and discover that in all major regions in the world, except Europe, people 
are more likely to favor immigration to stay at the current level or be increased. 
People in Europe are in a global perspective most negative towards immigration, as a 
majority wants less immigration into their country. This further proves the importance 
to include a broader set of countries in studies on attitudes towards immigrants to 
expand the understanding.  
 
     Kleemans and Klugman (2009) use three rounds of the WVS (1995/1996, 
2000/2001 and 2005/2006) covering 86 countries around the world. They find that in 
countries with higher levels of GDP people are more negative to letting immigrants in 
but more supportive for equitable treatment once they are in the country. They believe 
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in equal treatment on the labour market and are less likely to be against living next to 
an immigrant. Furthermore, they argue that in countries with higher levels of 
unemployment people have more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Kleemans 
and Klugman, 2009:18). They confirm the conclusions from many other studies on 
developed countries, that higher levels of education are related to more positive atti-
tudes towards immigrants. However, this is only true in rich countries, while it is the 
opposite in poorer countries (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:17). Mayda (2006:527) 
finds a similar result for education when she includes developing countries in her 
analysis. This further highlights the importance of including a broader set of countries 
with larger variation between them.  
 
     Whitaker and Giersch (2015) examine attitudes towards immigration in Africa and 
use the WVS (2000-2002 and 2005-2007), which includes 11 countries in Africa.  
They discover that people in countries with higher levels of democracy are more 
negative towards immigration (Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1552). They argue that 
this is a consequence of increased political competition, leading to more widespread 
anti-immigrant rhetoric. Immigrants are often seen as easy targets for politicians 
looking for someone to blame. Also, the value of citizenship increases as it 
incorporates the right to vote, hence more democratic countries have more to protect 
from outsiders (Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1541f). However, Orcés (2009:146f), 
examining attitudes to immigrants in Ecuador, finds that individuals supporting 
democratic values are more positive to immigrants in comparison to people 
supporting more authoritarian values.  Furthermore, Whitaker and Giersch 
(2015:1551) discover that in African countries with more ethnic diversity people are 
more opposed to immigration. This suggests that a more diverse society not 
necessarily is more welcoming towards foreigners. When immigrants are added to an 
already unstable mix they may be regarded as yet another group competing for power 
and resources  
 
     Examining attitudes towards immigrants in Latin America, Lawrence (2011:161) 
finds that the current inflow of immigrants into a country is a more important 
determinant than the total number of migrants in a country. In countries that 
experience increasing immigration people are more negative toward immigrants. At 
the individual level, the economic self-interest is the most important determinant of 
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immigration attitudes. People that are less well-off and dissatisfied with their current 
economic situation feel more threatened by immigrants. The less importance for 
cultural determinants may be due the shared linguistic and religious identity between 
most migrants and citizens in Latin America (Lawrence, 2011:161).  
 
     None of the previous studies on attitudes towards immigrants, covering less 
developed countries, consider the possible influence of welfare institutions on 
attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, to advance this strand of literature this study 
will examine the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants in 
the context of less developed countries. In the next section, the mechanisms between 
welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants, discovered in studies on 
developed countries, are examined in the context of less developed countries.   
2.4 Welfare institutions in less developed countries 
The institutional theory maintaining that institutions are able to shape individual atti-
tudes, requires that welfare institutions have been in place long enough to shape 
peoples’ basic norms and opinions. According to Arts and Gelissen (2001:287), 
individuals have to be accustomed to the welfare institutions and their social situa-
tions. It is only when welfare institutions have been in place for some time that people 
have had the chance to collect the necessary knowledge to behave in a socially 
accepted manner. For the previous studies on the influence of welfare institutions on 
attitudes towards immigrants this has not been a problem, as they examine developed 
countries with well-established welfare institutions. However, it may not be realistic 
to believe that the same institutional influence on citizens attitudes exists in less 
developed countries with a weaker institutional capacity. Thus, the mechanisms from 
the literature on welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants need to be 
contextualized in a weaker institutional setting. Since this has not been done before, 
there is no concrete guidance in previous literature and therefore the theorizing in this 
section is grounded on what reasonable can be expected from certain mechanisms in 
the context of less developed countries. 
 
     The creation of generalized trust among the citizens through welfare institutions 
can be more problematic in less developed countries. Sukkim (2010:292f) argues that 
the building of trust is more challenging in less developed countries, as they have 
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additional constraints and are not able to do things necessary for building generalized 
trust. For example, with weak institutions corruption can flourish and if citizens 
discover that civil servants are corrupt they generalize this to be true for all citizens 
(Rothstein and Stolle, 2003:199). Thus, the experience of wrongdoings in the public 
authorities erodes the generalized trust between citizens. Weak welfare institutions are 
also related to this problem, as more comprehensive welfare institutions are depend-
ent upon a high institutional trust. With a low trust in institutions citizens would not 
trust welfare institutions to redistribute their resources and the state’s capacity to 
collect taxes from other citizens. Furthermore, the world is more unequal now than at 
any point since the World War 2 and the largest rise in inequality has occurred in 
developing countries, particularly those with large economic growth (UNDP, 2013:1). 
This is a further obstacle for building trust as it is argued that more economic equality 
and equality of opportunity are leading to more generalized trust (Larsen, 2007:99f; 
Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005:44; Uslaner and Brown, 2005:889).  
 
     The mechanism of generalized trust is a demanding mechanism requiring a high 
institutional capacity. It is unlikely that many of the less developed countries have the 
institutional capacity to instill a higher generalized trust among the people through 
welfare institutions. Thus, this mechanism may not have a significant impact in this 
study where less developed countries are examined. 
 
     The mechanism of broader solidarity can be related to the mechanism of general-
ized trust. With less trust in society the broad solidarity should also be decreased. If 
one do not trust most other people in the society one may not feel cohesion and 
solidarity with them. With less trust people can be more solidary with friends and 
families but the broad solidarity should be less prevalent. The importance of welfare 
institutions can also be decreased, as people rely more on friends and families for 
security against poverty. With less importance on welfare institutions the effect of 
welfare institutions on the broader solidarity should be significantly smaller. As with 
the mechanism for generalized trust, widespread solidarity should require a high 
institutional capacity to be increased by welfare institutions. The state needs to 
demonstrate that it can accomplish certain acts of solidarity, in order to influence the 
solidarity in society. In less developed countries with a weaker institutional capacity 
this should be difficult to realize. A further obstacle for this mechanism, as discussed 
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before, is the lack of distinction between refugees and migrant workers in this study. 
Because Boräng (2012:145ff) discovers that the positive effect of more comprehen-
sive welfare institutions on individual attitudes towards immigrants are more promi-
nent for refugees compared to migrant workers. Hence, the mechanism of a broader 
solidarity in society due to comprehensive welfare institutions may have little impact 
in this study on less developed countries. 
 
     The mechanism of general economic safety can be more important in less devel-
oped countries, as people in general are poorer and in a more vulnerable situation. In 
this setting, welfare institutions should increase the notion of safety for more people 
in comparison to welfare institutions in a developed country. However, citizens that 
perceive themselves to be in a vulnerable situation may be more afraid of the 
increased competition from immigrants, as in a weaker institutional setting their 
safety are less guaranteed. The trust in state institutions to help you if you end up in a 
precarious situation may in general be lower in a weaker institutional setting. But the 
different levels of welfare institutions should be able to make a bigger impact on this 
mechanism. It does not require much to install some basic social safety nets to 
increase the individual economic safety. It does not require a long process of shaping 
the behavior of the citizens as the previous mechanisms discussed above. When social 
safety nets is installed and proven to work the general economic safety in society 
should rapidly be increased. Thus, this mechanism should theoretically be the most 
influential in the context of less developed countries. As discussed in the section 
describing the mechanisms in developed countries, the mechanism of general eco-
nomic safety should primarily influence attitudes along the material dimension.  
 
     The mechanism of state capacity goes hand in hand with the reasoning above that 
the citizens’ perceptions of the institutional capacity of the state may be lower in less 
developed countries. The state capacity in these countries should in general be lower 
but the expectation from the citizens should reasonable also be lower. With low 
expectations it may not require much in order to influence citizens’ perceptions of 
state capabilities. The introduction of functioning social safety nets discussed above 
may be enough to influence people to be more positive toward the state’s capacity. 
When institutions start delivering positive outcomes in a context where this is rare the 
perceptions of the state capacity should be enhanced. However, the state capacity is 
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probably estimated by more parameters than social safety nets. Citizens’ perceptions 
of health care, education, police etc. should also matter when they estimate the institu-
tional capacity of the state. Thus, it should require a more complete functioning of 
state institutions in comparison to the mechanism of general economic safety. Welfare 
institutions could also in less developed countries influence citizens’ perceptions of 
the state capacity but the impact should be small in the set of countries studied in this 
thesis.  
 
     To sum up this section, the mechanisms discovered when examining developed 
states can, to different degrees, also exist in less developed countries with a weaker 
institutional setting. More widespread solidarity and higher generalized trust are 
demanding mechanisms that could be a less prevalent outcome of welfare institutions 
in less developed countries. The mechanism of the perceptions of state capacity is 
also relatively demanding and may be less prevalent in the set of countries included in 
this study. The mechanism of general economic safety is the least demanding and 
should potentially be the most influential among the mechanisms when studying less 
developed countries. As previously discussed, the mechanism of general economic 
safety is more likely to be relevant for the material dimension of attitudes towards 
immigrants. It is worth mentioning that this study cannot empirically test which spe-
cific mechanism is accountable for the relationship between welfare institutions and 
attitudes towards immigrants. 
 
     The theoretical framework explored above lead to two hypotheses that will be 
tested in this thesis: 
 
• Hypothesis 1: More comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive 
attitudes towards immigrants.  
 
• Hypothesis 2: The effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immi-
grants should be more pronounced at the material dimension in comparison to 
the cultural dimension when less developed countries are studied.  
 
 	   15	  




A quantitative approach will be used to test the two hypotheses with individual level 
data from the WVS and country level data from different sources. The individual data 
from WVS is nested in different countries and it is assumed that “citizens are exposed 
to structural and organizational features that are the same for all of them but vary 
across groups” (Crepaz and Damron, 2009:453). So the individual attitudes towards 
immigrants can be driven by the institutional context on the country level and the use 
of a simple OLS regression would produce incorrect results. Instead, to properly 
account for the nested data a multilevel analysis is appropriate to capture the different 
contextual levels in the data (Field, 2014:815f; Snijders and Bosker, 2012:1). Another 
feature that needs to be considered is that the two dependent variables used in the 
study are dichotomous (see section 3.2.1), meaning they only have two values, either 
0 or 1. For dichotomous dependent variables it is appropriate to use a logistic regres-
sion (Snijders and Bosker, 2012:289ff) and therefore the chosen method for this study 
is a multilevel logistic regression. 
3.1 Data 
The individual data is retrieved from the WVS, which is a survey exploring individual 
values in different countries around the world. The sixth wave of WVS from 2010-
2014 includes 57 countries3 and around 85000 respondents (World Values Survey, 
2016a). Common problems related to public opinion studies are systematic measure-
ments error due to the order of questions and wordings, interviewer effects,4 and 
social desirability bias5 (Crepaz, 2008:63,266). Moreover, in comparative attitudinal 
research it can be problematic to establish cross-national validity. There is a risk that 
not values and attitudes differ but the connotation and definition of the different con-
cepts in different languages (Svallfors, 1997:287; Svallfors, 2003:502f). WVS uses 
standardized questionnaires that have been developed and improved during the years. 
These are translated into the local languages and independently translated back into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See descriptive statistics (3.3) for a list of all the countries included in this study. 
4 For example, the interviewer’s gender or race can influence the respondent to answer in certain ways. 
5 Social desirability bias means that the respondent adjusts his answer so it corresponds to what is thought to be the 
common norm in society. 
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English to control the accuracy of the translation. Additionally, the questionnaire is 
tested before it is used to find possible translation problems. If a question is problem-
atic to use in a certain country it is omitted from that country’s questionnaire (World 
Values Survey, 2016b). Interviews are conducted face-to-face and supervised by aca-
demic researchers (World Values Survey1, p. 4). Data from WVS is commonly used 
in academic publications and is considered to have both high reliability and high 
validity. Because of the wide coverage of countries around the world and the inclu-
sion of many less developed countries it is the most suitable individual survey data for 
this thesis. Other frequently used surveys for attitudes towards immigrants, like the 
International Social Survey Programme, European Social Survey and Eurobarometer 
mainly concentrate on developed countries and does not cover the countries targeted 
in this thesis. 
3.2 Operationalization 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
To capture both the cultural and material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants, 
two different questions from the WVS are operationalized as dependent variables. 
The first question is: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please 
mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” (World Values Survey2, 
p.3), where one answering option is ‘Immigrants/Foreign Workers’. The variable is 
coded as 0=mentioned and 1=not mentioned. Thus, a value of zero means the re-
spondent has negative attitudes towards immigrants and a value of one reflects more 
positive attitudes towards immigrants. This question reflects anti-immigrant attitudes 
along the cultural dimension and attitudes towards the multicultural consequences of 
immigration. This is natives’ resentment to immigrants living and coming to their 
country and simply the fact that an individual is an immigrant makes that person 
unwanted as a neighbor. The indicator would be even better if the answering option 
only included ‘Immigrants’ and not ‘Foreign Workers’. Because the negative 
connotation to having ‘foreign workers’ as neighbor could be based on the 
assumption that they have taken jobs from native citizens and therefore also includes 
a material dimension. Despite this possible shortcoming it has been used in previous 
research to indicate the cultural dimension of attitudes towards immigrants (Crepaz, 
2008:74ff) and it is the best available measure along the cultural dimension. 
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     The second dependent variable is the following question from the WVS: Do you 
agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements? When 
jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immi-
grants (World Values Survey2, p.3).  This variable is coded as 0=Agree and 
1=Disagree and the third alternative ‘neither agree nor disagree’ is not included.6 
Hence, a value of zero means more welfare chauvinism and a value of one reflects 
less welfare chauvinism and more positive attitudes towards immigrants. In contrast 
to the first dependent variable, this variable primarily captures the material dimension 
of attitudes towards immigrants, where natives fear the increased competition and the 
economic consequences from immigration. Crepaz (2008:152ff) also uses this ques-
tion to capture the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants. 
3.2.2 Independent Variable  
The independent variable of welfare institutions is operationalized by using the varia-
ble for Social Safety Nets (SSN) included in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI). BTI from 2010 consists of 128 countries selected according to the criteria that 
they are not yet fully consolidated democracies and market economies, and are con-
sidered as sovereign states (BTI, 2010a:6). BTI is an expert survey where one country 
expert for each country examines how well different criteria are fulfilled, by provid-
ing both written evaluations and scores. Another expert then evaluates the report and 
the scores are compared with other scores in the region. Finally, the BTI Board, con-
sisting of scholars and professionals, makes a final review before the reports are 
included in the index (BTI, 2010b:22).7 
 
     A problematic issue with this expert survey is that only one expert is responsible 
for examining a wide range of subjects, as for example economic performance, 
sustainability, political and social integration, and steering capability. This is a broad 
range of subjects that are difficult to evaluate and rate. It should be the case that the 
responsible expert consults other experts in the different fields but this is not certain. 
Furthermore, country comparisons between countries with expert evaluations can be 
problematic, as they interpret and understand questions and wordings differently. 
Despite these problems with expert surveys they are commonly used in academic re-
search. BTI is trying to avoid these weaknesses by having a reviewer examining the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Crepaz (2008:154) also excluded ”neither agree nor disagree” when coding this variable.  
7 For more information on the survey and its methodology see (BTI, 2010a). 
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results to include more than one expert opinion on the different subjects. According to 
Kitschelt (2015:5f), BTI is a trustworthy source, which potentially can fill some of the 
voids that currently exist when it comes to empirical measures of social policy outside 
the developed world.  
 
     The question covering welfare institutions included in the survey is: “To what ex-
tent do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old 
age, illness, unemployment or disability?” (BTI, 2010a:31). The score ranges be-
tween 1-10 and is divided into four different levels explained to make the scoring 
more coherent between the countries. The score levels are as following:  
 
“1-2= There are no state or societal measures for inclusion or compensation. Poverty 
is combated hardly at all, or only ad hoc. Healthcare is deficient for broad segments 
of the population. 
3-5= Rudimentary measures to avert social risks exist, but are extremely segmented 
in terms of territory, social stratum and sector. The country cannot combat poverty 
systematically on its own. 
6-8= Social networks are well developed in part but do not cover all risks for all 
strata of the population. Considerable portions of the population are still at risk of 
poverty. 
9-10= There is a solid network to compensate for social risks, especially nationwide 
health care and a well-focused prevention of poverty.” 
(BTI, 2010a:31) 
 
     Concerning welfare institutions in predominantly less developed countries, BTI 
SSN is an appropriate indicator. Another indicator commonly used for welfare institu-
tions is Esping-Andersens categorization of welfare regimes, but it does only include 
a few countries and all of them are developed. A second frequently used indicator is 
social expenditures as percent of GDP. This indicator is available for a wide range of 
countries and would be possible to use. However, social expenditure is too blunt to 
capture important aspects of the welfare institutions (Crepaz, 2008:142) and there are 
conceptual and empirical weaknesses to use social expenditures to evaluate welfare 
institutions (Scruggs and Allen, 2006:56). A classic example is from the United King-
dom when the Thatcher Government made major cuts in unemployment and sickness 
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benefits. Yet, the spending on unemployment increased because the number of unem-
ployed dependent on benefits increased. Consequently, only looking at the expendi-
tures would lead to the contradictory conclusion that the Thatcher Government ex-
panded welfare programs and benefits, while they actually were phased out (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:19).  
3.2.3 Control Variables 
This section presents variables at the country and individual level included in the 
study to control for different effects, which could influence the relationship between 
welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. It could be argued that the 
different dimensions of attitudes would need different control variables. However, 
since this study wants to compare the results of the cultural and material dimension it 
is appropriate to use the same control variables for the two different dependent varia-
bles. 
3.2.3.1 Country level8 
In previous research it has been found that the national economic context, usually 
indicated by GDP (Gross Domestic Product), influences individuals’ attitudes towards 
immigrants. Kleemans and Klugman (2009:18) find that individuals in countries with 
higher GDP are more negative to allowing people to come into the country. Accord-
ing to Semyonov et al. (2006:444), improved economic conditions lead to more posi-
tive attitudes towards out-group populations. Therefore, GDP seems to affect attitudes 
to immigrants and is included as a control variable at the country level.9 Data on GDP 
per capita10 is based on purchasing power parity and is retrieved from The World 
Factbook for 2010 in 2010 US dollars. 
 
     According to group threat theory individuals identify themselves with one or more 
groups and conflicts arise due to competition and diverse interests. Considering immi-
gration, this means that immigrants as a minority group threaten the majority group of 
natives. This produces negative attitudes towards the immigrant minority group. One 
explanation is the struggle over scarce resources where immigrants are perceived as a 
threat to the wellbeing of the native majority group (Ervasti et al., 2008:189; Ma-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Appendix 2 for the scores for each country on the country level variables.  
9 It could also be argued that GDP Growth could influence attitudes towards immigrants, as this would indicate if 
the economic situation is improving or declining. The competition from immigrants may be more threatening 
when the economic situation in a country is getting worse. This has been tested for but did not significantly change 
the result and is not included in the analysis. 
10 Only GDP in the rest of the study. 
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nevska and Achterberg, 2011:438; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010:287f). When the 
minority group grows it becomes a more intimidating contender for scarce resources, 
such as jobs and welfare benefits. Group threat theory can also be explained by 
individuals’ perceptions of a cultural threat. The native majority group fears that the 
minority group of immigrants threats their cultural traditions (Ervasti et al., 
2008:189f). Van Oorschot (2006:37) finds that immigrants are regarded as the least 
deserving group for welfare benefits when compared with elderly, sick and disabled, 
and unemployed. Therefore, large inflows of immigrants into a country can also influ-
ence welfare institutions, as the support among the citizens may decrease when immi-
grants perceived as undeserving receive welfare benefits. To take this into account a 
control variable of net migration per 1000 inhabitant11 from The World Factbook for 
the year of 2010 is included in the study. The perception of a threat should be in-
creased if there is a large inflow of immigrants into the country. It is believed that this 
effect is larger than the total number of foreign-population in a country. A stable stock 
of foreign-population does not have the same effect as a heavy inflow of immigrants 
into a country (Lawrence, 2011:161). A large inflow of immigrants into the country 
should also make the subject more exposed in media and therefore make citizens 
more aware of immigration. This may fuel citizens’ perceptions of a threat posed by 
the minority group of immigrants.  
 
     Related to the control variable on Net Migration it has been discovered in previous 
literature that the level of ethnic fractionalization in a country can have a negative in-
fluence on attitudes towards immigrants (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012:131; 
Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1551), while Mau and Burkhardt (2009; 224) argue that 
this effect is exaggerated. According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004:134) the degree of 
ethnic fractionalization in a country affects the amount of welfare spending, where 
more diverse societies allocate less resources on welfare spending. To control for eth-
nic fractionalization in a country, Fearon’s (2003) index for ethnic diversity is re-
trieved from the QoG Standard Dataset. This index identifies 822 ethnic groups in 
160 countries and measures the likelihood that two randomly selected individuals in a 
country belong to different ethnic groups. The index covers only groups that had at 
least one percent of the country’s population. The variable ranges between 0 indicat-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Net migration in the rest of the study. 
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ing a perfect homogeneity and 1 indicating a highly fragmented population (Quality 
of Government, p.229f).12 13 It is recoded to range between 0-10 to receive a result 
that is easier to interpret. 
 
     Whitaker and Giersch (2015:1552) find evidence that higher levels of democracy 
lead to more opposition to immigrants in African countries. They argue that the value 
of citizenship increases as it entitles citizens to vote and this lead to more protectionist 
attitudes towards immigrants. They also point out a more widespread distribution of 
anti-immigrant rhetoric as a reason why anti-immigrant attitudes are more frequent in 
countries with higher levels of democracy (Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1541). It has 
also been discovered that democracy can influence welfare institutions (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:15) and more specifically the development of social policies in devel-
oping countries (Carbone, 2012:171f). The variable fh_ipolity2 from the QoG Stand-
ard Dataset reflecting the level of democracy will be included as a control variable. It 
combines the scores in the Freedom House for political freedom and civil liberties 
with the score on the Polity Index in the Polity IV dataset. The score ranges between 0 
and 10 where 0 reflects least democratic and 10 most democratic (Quality of Govern-
ment, p. 68). According to Hadenius and Teorell (2005:36f), the combined measure of 
Freedom House and Polity IV is the most appropriate for democracy.  
 
     In the next section is the control variables at the individual level presented and dis-
cussed. 
3.2.3.2 Individual level14  
Education is considered to be an important factor at the individual level influencing 
individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants. It has been found in previous studies on 
attitudes towards immigrants that more educated individuals are more positive 
towards immigrants (Boeri, 2010:663; Chandler and Tsai, 2001:186f; Gang et al., 
2013:188; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010:79). It is argued that more educated 
individuals have more liberal attitudes, due to either a less vulnerable position in the 
labour market or an association between education and certain attitudes to culture 
(Dustmann and Preston, 2007:3). However, Kleemans and Klugman (2009:17) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For more information about the construction and methodology of the index see Fearon (2003).  
13 See Posner (2004) for a discussion on common problems of measuring ethnic fractionalization. 
14 See Appendix 3 for more details on the individual level variables. 
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discover that the positive effect of education only is true in richer countries while the 
effect is the opposite in poorer countries. To control for education the following 
question from the WVS will be included: “What is the highest educational level that 
you have attained?” (World Values Survey2, p. 19).15  
 
     According to Semyonov et al. (2006:444) and Lawrence (2011:161) economic 
prosperity decreases the perceived threat of the foreign population. At the individual 
level this is controlled for with an individual income variable. This indicates the indi-
vidual economic situation the respondents perceive themselves to be in. Respondents 
place themselves on a scale ranging from 1-10 where 1 is the lowest and 10 the high-
est income group in the country. 
 
     Another individual level characteristic included in the study is the respondents’ 
age. In previous research it has been found that age is negatively related to immigrant 
attitudes, where older respondents are more negative towards immigrants (Chandler 
and Tsai, 2001:181; O’Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:856). This can for example be due to 
specific differences in cultural attitudes or a fear that extensive immigration nega-
tively will affect the pension system with an increased fiscal burden (O’Rourke and 
Sinnot, 2006:843). A control variable for the respondents’ age from the WVS is in-
cluded in the study. Also gender will be included in the study, as it has been found in 
previous studies on attitudes towards immigrants that females are more positive to 
higher numbers of immigrants coming to the country (Chandler and Tsai, 2001:181; 
O’Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:856). This variable is also retrieved from the WVS and is 
coded as 0=Male and 1=Female. 
 
     Moreover, it has been pointed out that whether a person is born in the country or 
an immigrant in the country influence attitudes towards immigrants. Just and 
Anderson (2015:198f) discover that immigrants in a country have more positive 
attitudes to increased immigration. They argue that this is due to kinship and 
solidarity with other newcomers established in their shared experiences. They also 
have a better understanding of why people migrate and the troubles associated with 
migration. But also self-beneficial considerations such as opportunities to reunite with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Appendix 3 for specific coding. 
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relatives can be a reason why immigrants are more positive to further immigration. 
Thus, it is appropriate to control if the respondents are born in the country or an 
immigrant. The WVS includes the following question suitable for controlling this: 
“Were you born in this country or are you an immigrant?” (World Values Survey2, p. 
19). The answers are coded as 0=Born in the country and 1=Immigrant in this 
country. This indicator may not be perfect, as an individual can still perceive herself 
as an immigrant although she is born in the country. In contrast, an individual born 
outside the country but are well integrated in the host society may feel more like a 
citizen than an immigrant in the country. But in general this indicator should cover the 
intended characteristic of the respondent. 
 
     Unemployment has been discovered to be influencing individuals’ attitudes 
towards immigrants (Gang et al., 2013:187; Nagayoshi and Hjerm, 2015:155; 
Semyonov et al., 2008:8). Immigrants are perceived as an easy target when people 
look for someone to blame their ill on. Media and politicians pointing out immigrants 
as the reason behind high unemployment rates in the country can further intensify and 
legitimize the blaming of immigrants. To control for unemployment the question 
regarding employment from the WVS is included. The variable has been recoded so 
1=Unemployed and 0=Other.16 17  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Before looking at the outcome of the multilevel logistic regression some descriptive 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Appendix 3 for the original coding. 
17 The unemployment level in a country could also possibly affect the attitudes towards immigrants, as higher 
unemployment levels in a country could indicate a large threat to the economic situation and a weak national 
economic context. This has been tested but did not significantly impact the result and is not included in the 
analysis. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all variables included.18  	  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Immigrants as 
Neighbors 64175 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Native priority when 
jobs are scarce 50490 0.16 0.37 0 1 
BTI SSN 65707 5.89 1.76 2 10 
GDP  65707 14413.36 20743.48 400 145300 
Net Migration 65707 -0.35 3.43 -4.41 15.65 
Democracy 65707 5.77 2.88 0.25 10 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 64665 4.47 2.42 .04 8.80 
Gender 65707 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age 65707 40.37 15.85 16 99 
Education 65707 5.59 2.40 1 9 
Income 65707 4.9 2.1 1 10 
Born in country or 
immigrant 62459 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Unemployed 64508 0.10 0.30 0 1 	  
     Because part of the contribution of this study is the new context of less developed 
countries, it is relevant to display the countries included. The countries included in 
this study are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe.19 These are the countries included 
in both the sixth round of the WVS and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index from 
2010.  
 
     The result of the multilevel logistic regression is presented and analyzed in the fol-
lowing section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Appendix 4 for information on correlations between the different variables. 
19 There are 47 countries included in both BTI and WVS. But the two questions used as dependent variables have 
not been asked in all countries, therefore the total number of countries in the different analyses are not 47. There 
are also some loss of cases in the control variables used in the study, as can be seen in the tables presenting the 
result.  




In this section the results of the multilevel logistic regression is presented with two 
different sub-sections, one for the cultural dimension and one for the material dimen-
sion of attitudes towards immigrants. 
4.1 Cultural Dimension 
The result from the multilevel logistic regression for the cultural dimension is pre-
sented in Table 2 below. Model 0 is an empty model only including the dependent 
variable covering if the respondent would mind to have an immigrant as neighbor. 
The important aspect of Model 0 is the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) showing the por-
tion of the total variability in the dependent variable explained between countries 
(Field, 2014:816ff). The ICC coefficient is .248, which can be transformed to 24.8 
percent. Thus, 24.8 percent of the total variability in the dependent variable is ex-
plained at the country level and this confirms the necessity of a multilevel analysis to 
account for the nested data.  
 
     In Model 1 the independent variable BTI SSN, indicating the comprehensiveness 
of welfare institutions in the countries, is included. Hypothesis 1 predicted that more 
comprehensive welfare institutions would lead to more positive attitudes towards 
immigrants. However, BTI SSN is insignificant and does not seem to influence the 
dependent variable. This is also shown by the unchanged ICC coefficient proving that 
the unexplained variability at the country level is the same after the introduction of 
the independent variable. In Model 2 GDP is added as a control variable at the coun-
try level. As GDP is troubled with a skewed distribution the log of GDP is used in the 
analyses.20 With the inclusion of GDP the independent variable, BTI SSN, becomes 
significant and has a positive influence on peoples’ attitudes towards immigrants, in 
line with hypothesis 1. Thus, when GDP is controlled for there is a positive effect of 
welfare institutions on citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants. This is reasonable as 
BTI_SSN and GDP is rater highly correlated (0.5*).21 GDP has a significant negative 
effect on individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants on the cultural dimension. Hence, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The mean of Log GDP is 9.043 with 1.041 in standard deviation. It ranges between 5.991 and 11.887. 
21 See Appendix 4 
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individuals in more prosperous countries are more prone to be negative towards 
immigrants at the cultural dimension compared to individuals in poorer countries. 
This is in line with the finding of Kleemans and Klugman (2009:18) that people in 
more prosperous countries are more negative towards letting immigrants into the 
country.22 However, it goes against the finding by Semyonov et al. (2006:444) that 
economic prosperity lead to more positive attitudes towards the foreign population. 
 
In Model 3 Net Migration is included as a control variable but does not have a sig-
nificant influence on the people’s attitudes towards immigrants. In Model 4 the level 
of democracy is introduced but this does not demonstrate a significant influence on 
attitudes towards immigrants. Thus, previous findings of a negative relationship 
between level of democracy and attitudes towards immigrants are not found in this 
study. The inclusion of Democracy eliminates the significant positive effect of 
welfare institutions found in model 2 and 3. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The cultural dimension can be more representative to letting immigrants into the country and the equitable 
treatment more represents the material dimension of jobs. Thus, according to Kleemans and Klugman (2009:18) 
people in richer countries should be more negative towards immigrants at the cultural dimension. 
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Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent variable: Immi-
grant as neighbor.  0=mentioned (more negative attitudes) and 1=not 
mentioned (more positive attitudes).23 24 
	  
Note: ***p≤.01 **p≤.05  *p≤.10. Standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the question: Could you 
please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Where one answering option is 
‘Immigrants/Foreign Workers’ (World Values Survey2, p.3). 
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net 
Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy [fh_ipolity2] (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization 
[fe_etfra] (Teorell et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values 
Survey3). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The multilevel logistic regression has been tested without possible outliers in Net Migration (Zimbabwe and 
Kuwait) and GDP (Qatar). This did not lead to any significant changes in the result. 
24 The analysis has also been done without the countries that are missing at the material dimension (Tunisia, 
Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon) to control that these specific countries are not accountable for the different results 
between the dimensions. The result remained when these countries were removed from the analysis. 
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Ethnic Fractionalization  





Individual Level        
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)       .054*** (.020) 
Age       -.003*** (.001) 
Education (Low 1-9 High)       .031*** (.005) 
Income (Low 1-10 High)       .008 (.005) 
Immigrant (Native=0 























Random Effect        













Log Likelihood -33260 -33260 -33257 -33257 -33256 -32533 -30675 
AIC 66525 66526 66523 66525 66525 65080 61376 
BIC 66542 66553 66559 66570 66580 65143 61493 













Countries 46 46 46 46 46 45 42 
N 64175 64175 64175 64175 64175 63133 58699 
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 In Model 5 Ethnic Fractionalization is included in the regression but does not have a 
significant effect on the attitudes towards immigrants. In model 5 including all control 
variables at the country level no variable is having a significant influence on 
individual attitudes towards immigrants.  	  
     In Model 6 the control variables at the individual level are introduced making it the 
full model. In the full model there is no significant effect of welfare institutions on 
individual attitudes towards immigrants. Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 1 
when the cultural dimension is considered. The only significant influence at the 
country level is a negative effect of GDP demonstrating that cultural resentment is 
more prevalent in more prosperous countries.	   At the individual level it is demon-
strated that females are more positive to immigrants in comparison to males. Moreo-
ver, immigrants, younger people and more educated individuals are also more positive 
towards immigrants. The results of the individual level variables mainly confirm the 
results found in previous studies, except that income and unemployment are insignifi-
cant.25 Considering the ICC (.206) for model 6 it demonstrates that the full model is 
improved and explains more than the previous models. However, it also shows that a 
portion of the variability at the country level is still unexplained. To explore the 
different models further we can look at the Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC and for all 
three measures a lower number is demonstrating a better fitting model. They all 
demonstrate that the full model is the best fitting model of the ones tested in the 
analysis.	  
 
     To interpret the results in more detail the odds ratios are presented in Table 3 be-
low. Odds ratios show “the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one group com-
pared to another” (Field, 2014:880). If the value is higher than one it indicates that an 
increase in the independent variable leads to an increased odds for the outcome to oc-
cur. A value below 1 indicates that an increase in the independent variable leads to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kleemans and Klugman (2009:17) found that the positive effect of education was reversed in poorer countries. 
However, this study does not make an interaction between GDP and Education that would enable a similar 
conclusion.  
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decreased odds of the outcome to occur (Field, 2014:767).26 The odds ratios are good 
indicators for the impact of one variable on another (Crepaz, 2008:172).  
 
Table 3: Multilevel Logistic Regression for model 6 (full model) presenting 
odds ratios. Dependent variable: Immigrant as neighbor.	  	  	  	  
Cultural Dimension Odds Ratio 
BTI SSN 1.204 (.182) 
GDP .575** (.152) 
Net Migration 1.004 (.057) 
Democracy 1.086 (.064) 
Ethnic Fractionalization .931 (.064) 
Gender 1.055*** (.021) 
Age .997*** (.001) 
Education 1.031*** (.005) 
Income 1.008 (.005) 
Immigrant 1.414*** (.078) 
Unemployed .958 (.033) 
  
Note: ***p≤.01 **p≤.05  *p≤.10. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
     The only significant influence at the country level is GDP where one step up at the 
log of GDP (ranging between 5.99 and 11.89) decreases the odds of being positive 
towards immigrants with 42.5%. At the individual level, being a woman increases the 
odds of being positive towards immigrants with 5.5% in comparison to men. The neg-
ative effect of age implies that for a one year older individual the odds of being posi-
tive towards immigrants decrease with 0.4%. One step up at the education indicator 
(scale 1-9) increases the odds of more positive attitudes with 3.1%. The last 
significant effect at the individual level is if the respondent is an immigrant. This 
demonstrates that the odds of being positive towards immigrants are increased with 
41.4% for an immigrant compared with a native citizen. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 These odds should not be confused with sports betting where a higher odds means that an event is less likely to 
occur. Here a higher odds implies that an event is more likely to occur. 
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     An alternative analysis was made where the control variables were added, only 
together with the focal independent and dependent variable.27 Net Migration and Eth-
nic Fractionalization did not have a significant effect and were therefore excluded in 
the final model. In this alternative modeling the effect of welfare institutions on the 
cultural dimension of attitudes was significant (p=.084), although only at the 90 per-
cent significance level. Therefore the effect of welfare institutions on the cultural di-
mension of attitudes is sensitive to the specific modeling and cannot be considered as 
robust.  
 
     To summarize, no significant effect (or a very weak effect depending on the 
modeling) of welfare institutions on individual attitudes towards immigrants at the 
cultural dimension is discovered in this analysis. Thus, Hypothesis 1 maintaining that 
welfare institutions have a positive effect on individual attitudes towards immigrants 
does not hold true when attitudes at the cultural dimension are examined. However, 
there is significant influence from the level of GDP at the country level and from gen-
der, age, education and immigrant at the individual level, on attitudes towards immi-
grants at the cultural dimension.  
 
     The results for the material dimension are presented in the next section.    
4.2 Material Dimension 
In Table 4 below the results for the multilevel logistic regression covering the mate-
rial dimension of attitudes towards immigrants are presented. Model 0 is an empty 
model and only includes the dependent variable for the material dimension, asking the 
respondents if natives should be prioritized over immigrants when jobs are scarce. 
The ICC coefficient is .164 indicating that 16.4 percent of the variability in the de-
pendent variable is at the country level. In Model 1 the independent variable BTI SSN 
indicating the comprehensiveness of the welfare institutions in a country is added. 
There is no significant influence from the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions 
on the attitudes towards immigrants. However, when GDP is added in Model 2 a sig-
nificant positive effect from more comprehensive welfare institutions on attitudes to-
wards immigrants is discovered. Therefore, when GDP is controlled for and held at 
zero the effect of welfare institutions becomes significant, as was also the case at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Appendix 5. 
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cultural dimension. This is as expected as BTI SSN is rather highly correlated with 
GDP (0.5*), as can be seen in Appendix 4. The negative effect of GDP is not signifi-
cant.   
 
     In Model 3 Net Migration is included but does not significantly influence attitudes 
towards immigrants and the positive effect of welfare institutions remains when Net 
Migration is introduced in the analysis. Democracy is included in Model 4 and does 
not influence attitudes towards immigrants but the inclusion made the previously 
positive effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants insignificant. 
Ethnic Fractionalization is introduced in Model 5 and is demonstrating a significant 
positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants. This implies that more ethnic 
fractionalization in a country lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants. This 
goes against Whitaker and Giersch (2015:1552) who found that more ethnic 
fractionalization leads to more welfare chauvinism and is more in line with Mau and 
Burkhardt (2009:225) who argue that the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on 
attitudes towards immigrants is exaggerated. With the inclusion of Ethnic 
Fractionalization the effect of welfare institutions becomes significant again.  
 
     In Model 6 the control variables at the individual level is added to complete the 
full model. The inclusion of the individual-level variables increased the positive effect 
of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants. In the complete model it is 
established that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive atti-
tudes towards immigrants at the material dimension. This is in line with both Hy-
pothesis 1 claiming that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more posi-
tive attitudes towards immigrants and Hypothesis 2 stating that the effect of welfare 
institutions in less developed countries should me more pronounced at the material 
dimension. The negative effect of GDP is significant in the full model demonstrating 
that people in more prosperous countries are more negative towards immigrants in 
comparison to people in poorer countries. Ethnic Fractionalization is also showing a 
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Table 4: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent variable: When 
jobs are scarce natives should be prioritized. 0=Agree (more negative 
attitudes) and 1=Disagree (more positive attitudes).28 
	  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effect        
Country-Level        
































Ethnic Fractionalization (Low 0-





Individual Level        
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)       .140*** (.027) 
Age       -.004*** (.001) 
Education (Low 1-9 High)       .013** (.007) 
Income (Low 1-10 High)       .060*** (.007) 
Immigrant (Native=0 




Unemployed=1)       
-.003 
(.045) 













Random Effect        













Log Likelihood -20640 -20640 -20639 -20639 -20638 -20334 -18447 
AIC 41286 41287 41286 41288 41289 40682 36920 
BIC 41304 41313 41322 41332 41342 40743 37034 













Countries 43 43 43 43 43 42 39 
N 50490 50490 50490 50490 50490 49504 46086 
Notes: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05,  *p≤.10. Standard Errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Do you agree, disagree or 
neither agree nor disagree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce employers should give priority to 
people of this country over immigrants. (World Values Survey2, p3). 
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net 
Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy fh_ipolity2 (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization (Teorell 
et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values Survey3). 
 
     At the individual level the results are almost the same as the analysis for the cul-
tural dimension. Women, younger people, more educated and immigrants are all more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The multilevel logistic regression has been tested without possible outliers in Net Migration (Zimbabwe and 
Kuwait) and GDP (Qatar). This did not lead to any significant changes in the result.  
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positive towards immigrants. In contrast to the cultural dimension, income has a sig-
nificant positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension. 
This is supporting the theory developed in this thesis about the increased economic 
security and the stronger effect at the material dimension. The ICC shows that the best 
performing model is the full model (Model 6) including all the variables. Log Likeli-
hood, AIC and BIC examining the fit of the different models also demonstrate that the 
full model is the best performing model. 
 
     To make the results more intuitive and easier to grasp the odds ratios for the full 
model are presented in Table 5. From the odds ratios it is noticeable that one positive 
step on the index for welfare institutions leads to a 36% increase in odds that respond-
ents disagree with the statement that natives should be prioritized when jobs are 
scarce. Thus, there is a 36% higher odds that respondents are more positive towards 
immigrants along the material dimension moving one step (scale 1-10) at the index 
for welfare institutions.  	  
Table 5: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of model 6 (full model). 
Dependent variable: When jobs are scarce natives should be prioritized. 
 
Material Dimension Odds Ratio 
BTI_SSN 1.356** (.172) 
Log GDP .656* (.145) 
Net Migration 1.027 (.045) 
Democracy .988 (.046) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 1.133** (.062) 
Gender 1.150*** (.031) 
Age .996*** (.031) 
Education 1.014** (.007) 
Income 1.062*** (.007) 
Immigrant 1.610*** (.115) 
Unemployment .997 (.045) Note:	  ***p≤.01, **p≤.05,  *p≤.10. Standard Errors in parentheses.	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     For ethnic fractionalization there is an increased odds for positive attitudes of 13% 
moving one step (scale 0-10) to increase ethnic fractionalization. At the individual 
level the odds that respondents are more positive towards immigrants at the material 
dimension is increased with 15% for women in comparison to men. Increasing the 
education with one step (scale 1-9) increases the odds for positive attitudes with 1.4%. 
Furthermore, a one step increase in income (scale 1-10) leads to a 6% percent increase 
in odds of being positive towards immigrants. Being an immigrant increases the odds 
of being positive to other immigrants with 61%.    
 
     To visualize the result, a graph of predicted probabilities are showed below in 
Graph 1. Graph 1 displays the predicted probabilities of positive attitudes towards (a 
higher value means more positive attitudes) immigrants at the material dimension at 
different levels of welfare institutions (BTI_SSN). 
	  
Graph 1: Predicted probabilities of attitudes towards immigrants at the mate-
rial dimension at different levels of welfare institutions. All other variables held 
at their means. 
	  
Note: See Appendix 6 for details on the margins used in this graph. 	  
     As expected, there is a positive curve showing that more comprehensive welfare 
institutions lead to higher probability of positive attitudes towards immigrants at the 
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BTI_SSN, as only a few countries in this study have such high scores on welfare in-
stitutions. For example, only Slovenia receives the highest score of 10 and only four 
countries receive a score of 9 on welfare institutions. The results indicate that there is 
no significant difference when improving welfare institutions with one step on the 
scale between 1-10. However, when moving between, for example, level 4 and level 7 
there is a significant higher probability of positive attitudes towards immigrants at the 
material dimension in the country with a value of 7 on welfare institutions. This could 
be exemplified by comparing Egypt with a score of 4 on welfare institutions and Ro-
mania with a score of 7. The mean of the attitudes along the material dimension 
(0=Negative and 1=Positive) in Egypt is .029 whereas in Romania the mean is .133. 
 
     As for the cultural dimension, an alternative analysis was made with the country 
level control variables introduced with only the focal relationship.29 The effect re-
mained strong and the significance level increased to p=.009 from p=.036. Thus, the 
results of the material dimension are not sensitive to the specific modeling, as was the 
case with the result of the cultural dimension.   
 
     To summarize, at the material dimension welfare institutions have a positive effect 
on peoples’ attitudes towards immigrants. This confirms both Hypothesis 1 maintain-
ing that more comprehensive welfare institutions have a positive effect on attitudes 
towards immigrants and Hypothesis 2 claiming that the effect should be more pro-
nounced at the material dimension. It was also discovered that the level of GDP has a 
significant negative effect on individual attitudes at the material dimension while citi-
zens in more ethnic fractionalized countries are more likely to be positive to immi-
grants. At the individual level the results were almost the same as for the cultural 
dimension, as higher educated, younger people, women and immigrants are more pos-
itive towards immigrants. However, in contrast to the cultural dimension the level of 
income has a significant effect on individual attitudes along the material dimension.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Appendix 5. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between welfare institutions 
and individual attitudes towards immigrants, and to advance this strand of research by 
focusing on less developed countries. Two hypotheses have been tested where Hy-
pothesis 1 suggested that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more posi-
tive attitudes towards immigrants, while Hypothesis 2 stated that the effect of welfare 
institutions on attitudes towards immigrants should be more pronounced along the 
material dimension. The results confirm Hypothesis 2 that more comprehensive wel-
fare institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants at the material di-
mension but the effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants at the 
cultural dimension was sensitive to the specific modeling. Hypothesis 1 is only par-
tially confirmed, as the influence of welfare institutions is only significant and robust 
along the material dimension. A weak positive effect at the cultural dimension was 
attained when the specific modeling was changed but cannot be considered as a robust 
finding. The result is in line with Crepaz (2008:197f) who also discovers a positive 
effect of welfare institutions at the material dimension of attitudes towards immi-
grants but not at the cultural dimensions when studying developed countries. 
 
     The contribution of this thesis has been twofold: First, this thesis has advanced the 
theory of the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants for de-
veloped countries, to the context of less developed countries. It has contributed with a 
theoretical ground for future studies to build upon and develop further. Second, this 
thesis has conducted a broad empirical examination of the relationship between wel-
fare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants, in the previously unexplored con-
text of less developed countries. Moreover, the contrasting results for the material 
dimension and the cultural dimension prove that it is essential to distinguish between 
different types of attitudes towards immigrants. If the different dimensions are 
grouped together, important aspects of the attitudes will be missing and fewer conclu-
sions can be drawn from the result. It can also lead to wrongful conclusions as the 
dimensions may take each other out and show no result when there actually are im-
portant results when they are distinguished. 
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     The results of this study suggest that the mechanism of general economic safety is 
most attainable for less developed countries. Note that this is based on the reasoning 
of the different mechanisms in the theoretical framework, as the mechanisms were not 
empirically tested in the study. The mechanisms of broader solidarity, higher general-
ized trust and state capacity do not seem to have as strong influence when less devel-
oped countries are examined. A policy implication following this is that welfare 
institutions that improve the economic safety of the citizens may be prioritized in less 
developed countries with large inflows of immigrants. The result implies that when 
working against anti-immigrant attitudes in less developed countries, it is important to 
know the reason behind the negative attitudes. If it is a conflict connected to resources 
and the material dimension, the result of this study suggests that it can be relieved by 
improving welfare institutions related to the economic safety of the citizens. This 
result could influence and guide the work of organizations working with implement-
ing and developing institutional settings in developing countries. Increasing the posi-
tive attitudes towards immigrants could enhance the possibilities for a successful 
integration of immigrants in the country. 
 
     There are limitations related to the available data used for the analysis. The de-
pendent variables from the WVS may not be perfectly representative to the two differ-
ent dimensions of attitudes, as discussed in the methodological section. This is a com-
mon problem for studies using data that are not specifically collected for the actual 
study. This problem should be less critical for this study as the questions from the 
WVS have been used similarly along the two dimensions of attitudes in previous re-
search. Data on welfare institutions in developing countries is scarce and more alter-
natives to BTI are needed in order to further advance the literature on the effect of 
welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants in developing countries. Another 
limitation of the data is the failure to distinguish between economic migrants and ref-
ugees, as this could be important for the effect of the different mechanisms (particu-
larly broader solidarity) between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immi-
grants.  
 
     Hopefully, this study will inspire more future research on the effect of welfare 
institutions on attitudes towards immigrants in the developing world. Future research 
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should try to advance the theory laid out in this thesis further and explore the different 
mechanisms in the context of less developed countries in more detail. It would also be 
suitable to distinguish between different kinds of immigrants like refugees and mi-
grant-workers, as the influence from the different mechanisms should be different for 
different categories of immigrants. It may be beneficial to study attitudes towards 
immigrants in the developing world over time to see how and why they change in 
relation to the development of welfare institutions in a country. However, as stated 
above, improved data on welfare institutions in the developing world is needed to ad-
vance the research in this specific area. 	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7 Appendixes 	  
APPENDIX	  1	  
	  Number	  of	  respondents	  per	  country.	  	  
Country Observations Percent 
Algeria 1199 1,82 
Azerbaijan 1002 1,52 
Argentina 983 1,50 
Armenia 1090 1,66 
Bahrain 971 1,48 
Belarus 1519 2,31 
Brazil 1453 2,21 
Colombia 1479 2,25 
Chile 919 1,40 
China 2055 3,13 
Ecuador 1200 1,83 
Egypt 1523 2,32 
Estonia 1519 2,31 
Georgia 1191 1,81 
Ghana 1552 2,36 
India 1538 2,34 
Iraq 1189 1,81 
Jordan 1195 1,82 
Kazakhstan 1500 2,28 
Kuwait 1108 1,69 
Kyrgyzstan 1473 2,24 
Lebanon 1175 1,79 
Libya 2050 3,12 
Malaysia 1299 1,98 
Mexico 1928 2,93 
Morocco 1061 1,61 
Nigeria 1759 2,68 
Pakistan 1200 1,83 
Peru 1187 1,81 
Philippines 1199 1,82 
Poland 929 1,41 
Qatar 1042 1,59 
Romania 1467 2,23 
Russia 2415 3,68 
Rwanda 1527 2,32 
Singapore 1922 2,93 
Slovenia 1020 1,55 
South Korea 1195 1,82 
South Africa 3397 5,17 
Thailand 1144 1,74 
Tunisia 1153 1,75 
Turkey 1571 2,39 
Ukraine 1500 2,28 
Uruguay 973 1,48 
Uzbekistan 1469 2,24 
Yemen 967 1,47 
Zimbabwe 1500 2,28 Source:	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  Wave	  6,	  2010-­‐2014.	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APPENDIX	  2	  
	  



















Algeria 6 7400 -0,28 4,25 .320 
Azerbaijan 5 11000 -1,42 2 .188 
Argentina 6 14700 0 8,67 .255 
Armenia 6 5800 -4,16 5,83 .134 
Bahrain 9 40400 0 0,83 .551 
Belarus 6 13400 0,38 1,17 .372 
Brazil 7 10900 -0,09 8,67 .550 
Colombia 5 9800 -0,68 7,17 .656 
Chile 8 15500 0 10 .497 
China 5 7400 -0,34 1,17 .154 
Ecuador 5 7800 -0,66 7,08 .655 
Egypt 4 6200 -0,21 3,42 .164 
Estonia 9 19000 -3,29 9,75 .511 
Georgia 4 4800 -4,16 7,33 .490 
Ghana 5 1600 -0,61 9,08 .846 
India 4 3400 -0,05 8,5 .811 
Iraq 3 3600 0 4,08 .549 
Jordan 5 5300 -2,81 3 .509 
Kazakhstan 6 12500 -3,28 2,25 .664 
Kuwait 8 51700 15,65 2,42 .708 
Kyrgyzstan 5 2200 -2,58 5,92 .679 
Lebanon 4 14200 -2,43 6,08 .780 
Libya 8 13800 0 4,58 .151 
Malaysia 7 14700 -0,4 6,5 .596 
Mexico 6 13800 -3,38 7,83 .542 
Morocco 4 4900 -3,88 3,58 .479 
Nigeria 4 2400 -0,1 5,58 .805 
Pakistan 3 2400 -2,36 6,08 .532 
Peru 5 9200 -0,93 8,5 .638 
Philippines 5 3500 -1,31 7,83 .161 
Poland 9 18800 -0,47 10 .047 
Qatar 8 145300 -4,41 1,25 -- 
Romania 7 11500 -0,27 8,92 .230 
Russia 7 15900 0,28 4,75 .333 
Rwanda 4 1100 1,11 2,33 .180 
Singapore 8 62200 4,79 4,5 .388 
Slovenia 10 28400 0,4 10 .231 
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Sources: 
BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010) 
GDP Capita PPP (The World Factbook, 2010) 
Net Migration Rate per 1000 population (The World Factbook, 2010) 
Democracy: [fh_ipolity2] (Teorell et al., 2013) 
Ethnic Fractionalization: [fe_etfra] (Teorell et al., 2013)  
 
  
South Korea 8 30200 0 9,08 .004 
South Africa 6 10700 -3,13 8,92 .880 
Thailand 6 8700 0 6,75 .431 
Tunisia 6 9500 -0,38 6,67 .039 
Turkey 7 12300 0,53 7,67 .299 
Ukraine 6 6700 -0,1 6,92 .419 
Uruguay 9 13600 -0,14 10 .218 
Uzbekistan 5 3100 -2,84 0,25 .485 
Yemen 3 2600 0 1,99 .078 
Zimbabwe 2 400 12,87 1,99 .366 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Individual Level Variables  
 
Education 
V248: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent 
indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]: 
 
Highest educational 
level attained Freq. Percent Cum. 
No formal education 4150 6.32 6.32 
Incomplete primary 
school 4089 6.22 12.54 
Complete primary 




















4833 7.36 83.65 
University - level 
education, with 
degree 
10745 16.35 100.00 




V239. On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 
the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your 
household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions 





1 5079 7.73 
2 4478 6.82 
3 7317 11.14 
4 8934 13.6 
5 14224 21.65 
6 10414 15.85 
7 8159 12.42 
8 4865 7.4 
9 1340 2.04 
10 897 1.37 
Total 65707 100.00 
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Born in country or immigrant 
 
V245. Were you born in this country or are you an immigrant? 
1 I am born in this country. 
2 I am an immigrant to this country. 
 
Respondent 
Immigrant Freq. Percent 
I am born in this 
country 60241 96.45 
I am an immigrant to 
this country 2218 3.55 




V229. Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one 
job: only for the main job (code one answer): 
Yes, has paid employment: 
1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more) 
2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)  
3 Self employed  
No, no paid employment: 
4 Retired/pensioned  
5 Housewife not otherwise employed 
6 Student  
7 Unemployed 
8 Other (write in):______________________ 
 
Recoded: 1=Unemployed and 0=All other values 
 
Employment Status Freq. Percent 
All Other  58018 89.94 
Unemployed 6490 10.06 
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APPENDIX 4 
 





















































































neighbors 1           
  
Native priority 
jobs .07* 1          
  
BTI SSN -.06* .01* 1           
GDP -.09* -.02* .51* 1          
Net Migration .01* .01* .00 .12* 1         
Democracy .02* .03* .31* -.16* -.24* 1        
Ethnic Frac. -.08* .06* -.21* -.07* -.11* .22* 1       
Gender .02* .02* .01* .00 -.03* -.01 -.04* 1      
Age -.02* -.04* .15* .03* -.04* .07* -.12* .03* 1     
Education -.01* .01* .16* .13* -.01* .00 .00 -.05* -.21* 1    
Income -.02* .06* .05* .14* .06* -.08* .09* -.03* -.14* .25* 1   
Immigrant .01* .02* .08* .08* .00 -.06* -.02* .02* .09* .02* -.01 1  
Unemployment -.00 .01* -.08* -.05* -.01* .05* .08* -.04* -.11* -.03* -.09* -.02* 1 
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APPENDIX 5 
	  
Alternative	  Regression	  Tables	  
	  
Cultural Dimension: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent 
variable: Immigrant as neighbor.  0=mentioned (negative attitudes) and 1=not 
mentioned (positive attitudes). 
Note: ***p≤.01 **p≤.05  *p≤.10. Standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the question: Could you 
please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Where one answering option is 
‘Immigrants/Foreign Workers’ (World Values Survey2, p.3). 
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net 
Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy [fh_ipolity2] (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization 
[fe_etfra] (Teorell et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values 
Survey3). 
  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effect        
Country Level        











Log GDP   -.547** (.227)    
-.570** 
(.229) 
Net Migration    .006 (.043)    
Democracy (Less 0-10 More)     .096* (.053)  
-.061 
(.054) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  
(Low 0-10 High)      
-.101 
(.067)  
Individual Level        
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)       .053** (.020) 
Age       -.003*** (.001) 
Education (Low 1-9 High)       .027*** (.005) 
Income (Low 1-10 High)       .008* (.005) 
Immigrant (Native=0 























Random Effect        













Log Likelihood -33260 -33260 -33257 -33260 -33258 -32536 -31405 
AIC 66525 66526 66523 66528 66525 65080 62833 
BIC 66542 66553 66559 66565 66561 65116 62932 













Countries 46 46 46 46 46 45 43 
N 64175 64175 64175 64175 64175 63133 59740 
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Material Dimension: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent 
variable: When jobs are scarce natives should be prioritized. 0=Agree 
(negative attitudes) and 1=Disagree (positive attitudes). 
	  
	  
Notes: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05,  *p≤.10. Standard Errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Do you agree, disagree or 
neither agree nor disagree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce employers should give priority to 
people of this country over immigrants. (World Values Survey2, p3). 
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net 
Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy fh_ipolity2 (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization (Teorell 
et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values Survey3) 
 	  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed Effect        
Country-Level        











Log GDP   -.276 (.191)    
-.441** 
(.212) 
Net Migration    .033 (.033)    
Democracy (Low 0-10 High)     .025 (.042)   
Ethnic Fractionalization (Low 0-





Individual Level        
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)       .140*** (.027) 
Age       -.004*** (.001) 
Education (Low 1-9 High)       .013** (.007) 
Income (Low 1-10 High)       .060*** (.007) 
Immigrant (Native=0 




Unemployed=1)       
-.003 
(.045) 
















Random Effect        













Log Likelihood -20640 -20640 -20639 -20639 -20640 -20335 -18447 
AIC 41286 41287 41286 41287 41288 40679 36916 
BIC 41304 41313 41322 41323 41323 40714 37013 













Countries 43 43 43 43 43 42 39 
N 50490 50490 50490 50490 50490 49504 46086 
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Appendix 6 
 
The table below presents detailed information about Graph 1, displaying probabilities 




BTI_SSN Margins 95% Confidence Interval 
  Low High 
1 .033 (.021) -.007 .074 
2 .045* (.022) .002 .088 
3 .060** (.022) .017 .103 
4 .079*** (.020) .040 .118 
5 .105*** (.016) .074 .135 
6 .137*** (.014) .110 .164 
7 .177*** (.026) .126 .228 
8 .225*** (.050) .127 .323 
9 .283** (.082) .122 .444 
10 .349** (.120) .113 .584 
Note: ***p≤.001, **p≤.01,  *p≤.05. Standard Errors in parentheses.  
